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RECENT
LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITY
Beth A. Diebold

The Pain Relief Promotion Act of
1999: Whose Pain Does It Relieve?
"Terminally ill patients deserve better pain control precisely
because they have the same innate worth and dignity as all
other human beings.... [Physician-assistedsuicide].. . denies
the value of their lives and thereby undermines respectfor their
dignity and their legitimate needs-includingtheir need for
the best possible palliativecare."
Richard M. Doerflinger,National Conference of Catholic Bishops'
"Dying is personal.And it is profound. For many, the thought
of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent.A quiet, proud
death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.
Justice William Brennan, Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. Of
2
Health
On October 27, 1999, the House of Representatives
passed H.R. 2260, the Pain Relief Promotion Act
("PRPA"), by a margin of nearly 2:1.3 Currently awaiting
Senate approval, the bill's primary purposes include the
authorization of funding for research and education in
the area of palliative medicine, particularly at the end of
life, and the clarification of federal law regarding the
legitimate use of controlled substances in palliative
care.4 While the first goal of the bill has received almost
unanimous support from both health care providers as
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as well as consumers, the second remains controversial.
One concern voiced by opponents is the possible
"chilling" effect that the legislation might have on physicians' tendencies to aggressively treat pain in terminally
ill patients.5 Under PRPA, physicians would face criminal
prosecution for prescribing controlled substances to
hasten the death of a terminally ill patient.6 Some fear
that this legislation could cause doctors to undertreat
pain in these individuals in order to avoid possible criminal allegations. In addition, because the regulation of
medical practices is the responsibility of the states and
their medical boards, and not of the federal government,
critics contend that this legislation violates Constitutional
principles of federalism. In fact, it has been suggested
that the real purpose of PRPA is to override Oregon's
Death With Dignity Act, a law that many PRPA supporters adamantly oppose.7
This article will examine the current status of the
laws surrounding pain management in medical care and
physician assisted suicide. It then identifies the proposed
changes that would occur under PRPA. Finally, the federalism and palliative care issues that have been raised by
PRPA opponents are addressed, along with the responses
to those arguments that have been made by the bill's
supporters.
The Development of Palliative Care Laws
In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), which restricted the use of controlled substances, gave the federal government control
over their intrastate as well as interstate traffic, and
required the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"),
under the Attorney General of the Department of Justice,
to oversee a federal system of enforcement and penalties.' Because many of the materials regulated by the
CSA are useful in the treatment of pain or injury, Congress authorized their use by physicians for "legitimate
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medical purposes" only, requiring that physicians and
pharmacists apply to the DEA for a special license authorizing them to administer regulated substances.9 Consequently, although physicians receive their licenses to
practice medicine from state medical boards and are
required to comply with state regulations concerning the
lawful practice of medicine, the ability to prescribe controlled substances must be authorized by the federal
government.
Due in part to a concern regarding the misuse of
prescription drugs in lethal overdoses, Congress
amended the CSA in 1984, allowing the DEA to revoke a
physician's license to prescribe if such was used to endanger the health and safety of another. 10 Currently, a
physician must be prepared to explain to DEA officials
her purpose in prescribing controlled substances, and she
risks criminal penalties as well as loss of the DEA registration if controlled substances are prescribed for unauthorized purposes."
In 1997, Congress specifically indicated its position
on the issue of physician assisted suicide with the passage of the Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act,
which prohibited federal funds, health care facilities and
health care programs from being used for assisted suicide
or euthanasia. 2 Indeed, President Clinton, in signing the
bill, stated that the legislation would allow the federal
government to "speak with a clear voice in opposing
13
these practices."
That same year, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, ruling that the
"right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, and thus, the state of Washington's ban on assisted suicide was not unconstitutional. 4 However, the
Court went on to acknowledge the uncertainty of the law
in this area, inviting the states to "continue to debate and
experiment with this issue."15 Within months of the
Washington decision, the Death With Dignity Act, a refer-
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endum which had passed in 1994 through two separate
votes by Oregon residents, became effective in the state
of Oregon. Generally, the legislation allows a terminally
ill adult, judged by two separate physicians as having
less than six months to live and being of sound mind, to
request a lethal dose of a controlled substance from a
prescribing physician.16
However, in a November, 1997 letter responding
to an inquiry by Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry
Hyde, DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine made a
determination that physician assisted suicide with the
use of federally controlled substances did not constitute a
legitimate medical purpose and thus violated the CSA."7
Because the 1984 amendment to the CSA allows the DEA
in such cases to revoke a physician's prescription license
and commence criminal proceedings regardless of
whether state laws have been violated, the determination
effectively quashed the ability of Oregon physicians to
provide the very services that state residents had voted to
allow. The determination also indirectly prevented all
states from "experimenting" with the issue, a process that
the Supreme Court had encouraged states to do in its
Washington opinion.
In response to the public outcry created by the
DEA determination, Attorney General Janet Reno issued
a subsequent letter in 1998 overruling the 1997 statement.
Currently, according to the Attorney General, the federal
CSA is enforceable against physicians' use of controlled
substances for assisted suicide only to the extent that
states have not authorized assisted suicide. 8 Unfortunately, as proponents of PRPA point out, this ruling
alsorendered a contradictory result, as it allowed state
law to limit the applicability of the federal CSA, and
indirectly forced the federal government to support the
practice of physician assisted suicide by licensing physicians to distribute the federally-regulated drugs used in
lethal overdoses. 9
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Since 1998, several bills have been introduced in
Congress attempting to clarify what is now an extremely
unsettled area of the law. The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act ("LDAPA"), introduced in 1998 and approved by
both House and Senate Judiciary Committees, was one
bill which attempted to overrule the 1998 Attorney General determination. The bill sought to render physician
assisted suicide an invalid medical purpose for the administration of controlled substances regardless of state
law provisions. ° Seeking to establish a substantive policy
against the use of controlled substances for assisted
suicide throughout the 50 states, the proposal caused
significant concern throughout the health care community regarding the effects it would have on a physician's
ability or willingness to prescribe controlled substances
even strictly for pain relief.2 The bill was never enacted
due to critics' fears that this new authority might be
construed as a mandate for the DEA to begin scrutinizing
medical decisions in order to determine whether assisted
suicide had occurred.
PRPA Provisions
Proponents of PRPA contend that the bill is designed to allay the very concerns raised by critics of
LDAPA.22 According to Henry Hyde (R-IL), co-author of
PRPA, one of its purposes is to "legitimate [the] use of
controlled substances in pain management and palliative
care." 2' Title I of PRPA officially recognizes palliative
care as a legitimate medical purpose, and authorizes
prescription of controlled substances to alleviate pain
"leven if the use of such a substance may increase the risk
of death."24 However, the Act also provides that opiate
drugs and other controlled substances may not intentionally be used "for the purpose of causing death or assisting another person in causing death."' Physicians
found to be in violation of this section of the Act would
be subject to a criminal investigation by the DEA and
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possible imprisonment for 20 years to life.26 Furthermore,
in determining whether this law has been violated, the
US attorney general "shall give not force and effect to
state law authorizing or permitting assisted suicide or
euthanasia."27
The second purpose of the legislation is to promote research, education and development in this area.
Title II of PRPA authorizes $5 million to be made available on an annual basis for programs providing "education and training to health care professionals in palliative
care." 28 In addition, the Act instructs the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ", formerly the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research) to develop
a program to "advance scientific understanding of palliative care. ' 29 The AHRQ would also be responsible for
educational directives such as collecting and disseminating palliative care protocols to health care providers,
educational institutions and consumers °
The "Chilling" Issues
PRPA critics argue that the legislation would
"chill" the tendency of medical professionals to aggressively treat pain for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which is that they would be threatened with a
criminal investigation anytime a terminally ill patient
treated with controlled substances dies.3' According to
testimony given before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, "regulatory scrutiny [is] the cause of the unrelieved pain problem."32 In order to avoid the disruption,
embarrassment and expense that an investigation would
generate, physicians would likely undertreat pain in their
terminally ill patients. As a result, these individuals
would endure ignoble, needless suffering, opponents
conclude.33
Supporters of the bill argue that it would promote
the opposite effect because, in addition to the research
and education it would foster in this area, it would
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formally recognize the use of controlled substances for
pain management as a "legitimate medical purpose"
even if large doses were prescribed which unintentionally hastened death.34 Currently, physicians can be faced
with a criminal investigation of their prescribing practices under the CSA for administering controlled substances to a patient who later dies as a result, even if the
drugs were only intended for palliative purposes. 35 In
addition, investigations of physicians' prescribing practices already occur when drug diversion, substance abuse
and other illegitimate uses of controlled substances are
suspected.36 Under PRPA, a doctor would be innocent of
any criminal wrong-doing in a situation where the patient dies as a result of controlled substances being administered for pain relief. Thus, according to supporters,
the Act would allow doctors to treat pain more aggressively than they might currently feel comfortable with,
because they would be less constrained by burdensome
legal consequences.37
However, the purpose of a criminal investigation
under PRPA would be to determine, in hindsight, the
intent of the physician in treating the patient. This is a
second reason why PRPA could negatively affect palliative care, particularly in terminally ill patients. 8 Under
the proposal, intent is established where there was
"knowledge that death was substantially certain to occur
as a result of the conduct, or where death should have
been reasonably expected to occur as a result of the
conduct."3 9 Unfortunately, aggressive treatments are
often necessary to relieve a terminally ill patient's feelings of pain and suffocation, and the amount of medication that is effective in one patient may not even begin to
alleviate the suffering in another.4° Furthermore, controlling pain in dying patients sometimes, though rarely,
requires such large doses of drugs that the patient's
breathing reflex is suppressed and the dying process is
hastened. 41 Even experts in bioethics and health care law
disagree as to when palliative care ends and euthanasia
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begins.42
Consequently, criminal intent could be found in a
circumstance where none existed. How would a court
view a physician whose patient, after repeatedly requesting assistance in hastening her own death, subsequently
died from an overdose of pain-killing medication that
was legitimately administered for palliative purposes?
One supporter of the bill, the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, contends that the difference between
consequences which are intended and those which are
merely foreseen "... . is not especially obscure."43 In
testimony given in support of PRPA on behalf of that
organization, Richard M. Doerflinger, of the Secretariat's
Office for Pro-Life Activities, pointed out that pain control requires careful titration of the drugs administered in
order to alleviate pain with minimal side effects, whereas
assisted suicide generally involves one sudden and
massive dose of drugs. 4' Medical practitioners strongly
disagree that the determination is as easily discernible as
this, however.4 s
Finally, a physician allegedly violating this Act
would be subject to a DEA-conducted investigation of
her medical decisions under the provisions of the CSA. 4
Opponents argue that DEA officials are unqualified to
distinguish between actions which constitute pain management and those which intentionally hasten death.4 7
Furthermore, physicians have voiced concern with the
idea of "medically untrained [bureaucrats] deciding if a
doctor is using too much pain medication."' Indeed, the
position echoes a 1998 statement in which the Department of Justice expressed its lack of support for the
LDAPA for the same reason. 49 As Joseph N. Onek testified for the DOJ, "Idletermination of whether a
practitioner's conduct which results in a patient's
death-either in a specific instance or in general-is 'an
appropriate means to relieve pain' is far afield from the
DEA's role as envisaged by Congress under the original
rubric of the... CSA. The medical, scientific, ethical, and
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related aspects of the practice of medicine at the end of
life would involve DEA in issues in which it has no
particular expertise.""a
Supporters counter this position by first pointing
out that the DEA already has the authority to revoke a
physician's DEA registration for assisting suicide in any
of the 49 states where the practice has not been legalized. 1 In addition, they reiterate that the educational
programs implemented under PRPA would be designed
to enlighten law enforcement personnel, such as DEA
officials, as well as health care practitioners, so that
investigators would be better able to evaluate the different decisions made under different circumstances. 2
Regardless of whether PRPA is enacted into law,
physicians in general have expressed support for a training program that would be aimed at helping law enforcement personnel better understand the medical questions
that enter into palliative care practices, particularly in
terminally ill patients. 3 Within the context of PRPA,
however, many remain doubtful that such a program
would truly allow these individuals to adequately evaluate many of the situations that would be in question.'M As
indicated in testimony before the House, "[it is unrealistic to think the Secretary of Health and Human Services
will be more successful at effectively training law enforcement officials than medical schools or Boards of
Medical Examiners have been at training physicians."55
The Constitutional Issues
Perhaps the best arguments made on both sides
for their respective positions are those concerning the
Constitutional questions. Although a discussion of the
Constitutional issues surrounding the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide is beyond the scope of this
article, a brief summary of those that have been raised is
helpful in order to better evaluate the positions outlined
above.
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It is no secret that supporters of PRPA also generally support a nation-wide ban on physician-assisted
suicide. Considering the Constitution's separation of state
and federal powers, the fact that states have long regulated their own medical practices, and the role of the
states in the physician-assisted suicide question indicated
by the Supreme Court in its Glucksberg opinion, however,
it is unlikely that federal legislation banning physicianassisted suicide altogether could be enacted and successfully upheld in court. However, the federal government
can, and has, indicated that it does not support the practice.56 PRPA is simply one more means through which
the federal government chooses to further its objective.57
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the CSA regulates the dispensing of controlled substances on a federal
level.5 8 Therefore, even if a physician is authorized by the
state to prescribe medications, she is only able to prescribe controlled substances with a federally-administered license from the DEA and is subject to revocation of
that license and possible criminal charges if her prescribing practices "endanger public health and safety."59
Supporters of PRPA contend that physicians who prescribe controlled substances intending to hasten the death
of a terminally ill patient should be subject to investigation of their actions because they are endangering the
health and safety of their patients. 60 Furthermore, by
allowing these doctors to retain their DEA licenses, the
federal government is supporting a practice which it
specifically opposes and which has never been authorized by Congress or the President. 61 Finally, to allow the
1998 Attorney General's determination to stand is to
allow the states to limit the application of federal law,
which is specifically prohibited by the Constitution.62
Opponents of PRPA point out that the CSA grants
a physician the authority to prescribe controlled substances "if the applicant is authorized to dispense...
controlled substances under the laws of the State in
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which he practices," and thus, if a state legalizes physician assisted suicide, then the DEA license of a doctor
who has complied with the state laws regarding practice
should not be revoked.63 While this is true, the Act also
allows revocation of the DEA license for endangering
public health and safety, as stated above. So if one considers such practice "endangerment," then revocation
would be authorized.
Perhaps a stronger argument on behalf of those
opposing PRPA and federal bans on physician assisted
suicide is that such legislation gives the federal government the responsibility to "define appropriate medical
practice and regulate such practice through the use of
criminal penalties." 64 Opponents contend that the practice of medicine and its regulation is a responsibility that
belongs to the states, not the federal government. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed that the
states are the appropriate forum in which this issue
mustbe addressed. In her concurring opinion to Washington, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated that "[t]hroughout
the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician assisted suicide. Our holding permits
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society."6" Justice O'Connor continued: "There is no
reason to think the democratic process will not strike the
proper balance between the interests of terminally ill,
mentally competent individuals who should seek to end
their suffering and the State's interest in protecting those
who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.
...
In such circumstances, 'the challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding... liberty
interests is entrusted to the "laboratory of the States.' 6 6
Conclusion
Everyone, from health care practitioners and
consumers to the legislators themselves, agrees on the
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need for better palliative care. PRPA effectively fosters
that goal through its Title II provisions for research and
educational initiatives. However, this intent may be
hindered by the punitive measures contained in Title I.
Although legislators point out that Title I will clarify the
status of the law in this area to protect both physicians as
well as their patients, this is precisely what may compromise Title II benefits. It appears to be the legislators,
rather than health care consumers, who so strongly
desire the clarification provided in Title I. In Oregon, at
least, health care consumers have twice stated that they
don't want this type of "protection."
Regardless of one's personal views on physician
assisted suicide, PRPA provisions beg the question:
whose pain is being relieved?
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